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Introduction
Labor is heterogeneous: Applicants for any given job are differently suited to fill it. Faced
with a number of applicants, a firm selects the best among them. Increasing its wage
offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard, thereby
improving the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off between the
wage level and the productivity of the workforce are known as selection wages–a variant of
efficiency wages (S 2005, 2007). The mechanism is explained in Section 1.
If the trade-off between the wage level and labor productivity differs for males and females,
different wages for males and females will result and group discrimination obtains. This
is to be expected. Empirical studies suggest that women and men differ in responsiveness
to wage changes: The number of female applicants for a job opening reacts less to wage
changes than that of males (M 2005, Ch. 7, S 2007, H et al. 2008, H
et al. 2009). Hence an increased wage offer for males will attract more applicants and will
permit a more pronounced tightening of the hiring standard for males as compared to
females. This renders it worthwhile for a profit-maximizing firm to offer a lower wage for
women than for men. Section 2 develops this idea.
The core behavioral assumption used here–a different responsiveness of males and females
to wage differentials–accords nicely with prevailing social roles and stereotypes encountered
in many economies, that tie women more closely to the home than men. Such sterotypes,
shared by men an women alike, effectively reduce the labor market options of women and
render them less responsive to wage differentials. According to the view proposed here, this
induces discrimination. Such discrimination feeds back on social roles and stereotypes. The
process is explained in Section 3. A brief discussion of quotas and laws that enforce equal
pay follows in Section 4.
The source of discrimination–the behavioral impact of social roles and stereotypes–is
sometimes portrayed as a matter of “tastes.” This seems misleading, as such parlance
assimilates widely shared attitudes and convictions to private preferences that have no
bearing on others. Yet if such “tastes” are envisioned as conditioned by social roles and
expectations, prevailing discrimination theories contribute to our understanding of the
phenomenon. Section 5 comments on these contiguous issues. A conclusion follows.
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Figure 1: (a) The labor supply function f (θ, w,W ) gives the number of workers of
productivity θ willing to work at the firm for the wage w, given the market wage level W .
Average productivity is θ¯. (b) If the firm increases the wage offer w, supply increases for
all grades of labor. A decrease in the market wage level W would entail a similar change.
1 Selection Wages
Consider a labor market where workers differ in productivity. There are a number of firms
operating in the market. Each of these firms employs a number of workers and offers a
certain wage. In the aggregate, this results in a certain level of employment N and a certain
average market wage rate W .
Labor supply for a single firm is described by a function
f (θ, w,W ) > 0. (1)
It gives the number of workers of productivity θ willing to work at that firm for the wage w,
given the market wage level W. For simplicity of exposition, all variables are taken as real.
The supply function is the continuous analogue of a histogram, akin to a density function.
Productivities θ range from θ0 to θ1 (Figure 1 (a)).
We assume that an increase of the wage offer w increases the supply of all grades of labor
(fw > 0). This effect decreases with an increasing wage offer (fww < 0). For any given
wage offer w, an increase in the market wage level W decreases supply as this indicates an
improvement in outside options (fW < 0). An increase of the market wage level acts like
a decrease of the wage offer on the marginal effect of wage increases (fwW > 0). Figure 2
illustrates the effect of wage changes on supply. Formally we have
θ [θ0, θ1] , fw > 0 , fww < 0, fW < 0 , fwW > 0. (2)
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Note that labor supply is to be conceived as comprising all workers that could be hired
by the firm under consideration, irrespectively of whether they are employed elsewhere, or
unemployed.
The firm has a technologically fixed number of jobs n to fill. The minimum wage that is
required to fill these jobs is implicitly defined by
n =
θ1∫
θ0
f (θ, w0 (W ) ,W ) dθ
and is denoted by w0 (W ). It is the competitive wage. Because of
w′0 = −
∫ θ1
θ0
fW dθ∫ θ1
θ0
fw dθ
> 0 (3)
the competitive wage is an increasing function of the market wage level W .
The firm has to pay at least the competitive wagew0 in order to fill its vacancies, but it can
offer more. If it does so, it will improve the number of applicants, including more productive
applicants. This makes it possible to screen workers and select only the best applicants,
that is, only applicants with productivity above a certain threshold value s (w,W ) that is
implicitly defined by the equation
n =
θ1∫
s(w,W,n)
f (θ, w,W ) dθ. (4)
The threshold s (w,W, n) is the hiring standard. From (4) we obtain
sw =
1
f
∫ θ1
s
fw dθ > 0 , sW =
1
f
∫ θ1
s
fW dθ < 0 , sn = − 1
f
< 0. (5)
The firm can increase its hiring standard if it offers a higher wage rate (sw > 0). If the
market wage level increases, supply at the given wage offer is reduced and the firm must
lower its hiring standard (sW < 0). Further, the hiring standard is to be reduced if more
workers are to be hired (sn < 0). Note that workers with productivity less than s that are
not hired are not necessarily unemployed, as they may be employed elsewhere, although
they would prefer employment at the firm under consideration, given its wage offer.
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The wage rate w and a market wage level W imply average productivity
a (w,W, n) =
∫ θ1
s(w,W,n)
θf (θ, w,W ) dθ∫ θ1
s(w,W,n)
f (θ, w,W ) dθ
=
1
n
θ1∫
s(w,W,n)
θf (θ, w,W ) dθ. (6)
This is the productivity curve depicting the relationship between the wage offer and the
productivity of the firm’s workforce (Figure 3).1 Its derivatives are
aw =
1
n
∫ θ1
s
(θ − s) fw dθ > 0
aww =
1
n
∫ θ1
s
(θ − s) fww dθ − 1
nf
(∫ θ1
s
fw dθ
)2
< 0
aW =
1
n
∫ θ1
s
(θ − s) fW dθ < 0
awW =
1
n
∫ θ1
s
(θ − s) fwW dθ − 1
nf
(∫ θ1
s
fW dθ
)(∫ θ1
s
fw dθ
)
> 0
an = − 1
n2
∫ θ1
s
(θ − s)f dθ = − 1
n
(a− s) < 0 (7)
where s = s (w,W, n). In other words: Average productivity increases if the wage offer w
increases. The effect diminishes with an increasing wage rate. An increase in the average
wage level W works similar to a decrease in the wage offer w, as it improves outside options
of the workers. This implies the third and forth inequalities in (7). Finally we note for later
use that an increase in n decreases average productivity.
The firm faces, thus, a trade-off between the wage level and the productivity achievable.
The argument is illustrated in Figure 2. The resulting productivity curve is depicted in
Figure (a). According to (3) and (7) the competitive wage increases with an increasing
market wage level W , and the productivity curve shifts down (Figure 3 (b)).
Given the product price p, the firm will maximize the the difference between the produc-
tivity of its staff, valued at the market price of the product, and labor costs by selecting the
appropriate wage rate.2
p a (w,W, n)− w → max
w
! (8)
We assume that the product price is high enough to assure profitability. The first-order
1 The concept of the productivity curve has been introduced in S (1978, 393). 2 The product price
p is to be understood as the contribution margin of a worker with θ = 1, that is, the receipt for the production
produced by such a worker minus variable non-labor costs.
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Figure 2: (a) Employment n implies a hiring standard s and average productivity a.
Workers with productivities below s are not hired. (b) Increasing the wage offer increases
supply and permits the firm to increase its hiring standard to s′. This entails an increased
average productivity a′.
condition for a profit maximum is
p aw − 1 = 0. (9)
As aww < 0, the second order condition is satisfied. Equation (9) may alternatively be
written as
ε (w,W, n) =
w
pa
(10)
with
ε (w,W, n) :=
∂a
∂w
w
a
as the elasticity of productivity. Condition (10) states that the elasticity of productivity is to
be equal to the ratio of labor costs to sales minus variable costs. This elasticity condition
differs from the Solow-condition usually encountered in efficiency wage theory that requires
the elasticity of productivity to equal one in equilibrium (S 1979, 80; S 1978,
340). The difference is due to the different (and, it is hoped, more realistic) assumption
regarding the technology of the firms.
Equation (9) implies an optimal wage rate
w∗ = w (W, p)
with is referred to as the wage. Its determination is depicted in Figure 3 (c). Regarding its
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Figure 3: (a) The minimum wage the firm must pay is the competitive wage w0. In-
creasing the wage above that level permits a tightening the hiring standard, engendering
increased productivity, as described by the productivity curve a (w,W, n). (b) An increase
in the wage level from W to W ′ shifts the productivity curve down and increases the
competitive wage from w0 to w′0. (c) The wage w
∗is given by the condition that the slope
of the productivity curve equals 1p .
properties we find
w∗W = −
awW
aww
> 0
w∗p = −
aw
paww
> 0. (11)
In other words: An increasing market wage will induce the firm to offer a higher wage
rate, and an increasing product price will increase the wage offer, too.
2 Discrimination
Now consider the case of two groups of workers, males and females. Index all symbols
referring to females by f and those referring to males by m. Hence f f and fm denote the
respective supply functions, W f and Wm refer to the respective market wage levels, wf and
wm stand for the firm’s wage offers, and so forth.
The firm has to man n jobs by hiring men and women:
n = nf + nm (12)
With a hiring standard sf for women and a hiring standard sm for males, the average
productivity of females is af and that of males is am. The productivity of the work force is
thus
a =
nf
n
af
(
wf ,W f , nf
)
+
nm
n
am (wm,Wm, nm) .
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The average wage rate is
w =
nf
n
wf +
nm
n
wm.
The firm wants to maximize profits pa− w which is:
p
(
nf
n
af
(
wf ,W f , nf
)
+
nm
n
am (wm,Wm, nm)
)
−
(
nf
n
wf +
nm
n
wm
)
with regard to wf , wm, nf , and nm under the constraint (12). This gives rise to the
Lagrangian
L = p
(
nf
n
af
(
wf ,W f , nf
)
+
nm
n
am (wm,Wm, nm)
)
−
(
nf
n
wf +
nm
n
wm
)
+ λ
(
n− nf − nm) . (13)
The first-order conditions for a maximum are
∂L
∂wi
=
ni
n
(
paiwi − 1
)
= 0 (14)
∂L
∂ni
=
p
n
(
ai + niaini
)− wi
n
− λ = 0 , i = f,m. (15)
In view of (7) this implies
af
wf
= amwm =
1
p
(16)
p · s (wf ,W f , nf)− wf = p · s (wm,Wm, nm)− wm (17)
The first condition is similar to the condition (9). It states the group-specific wage is
determined by the condition that the slope of the productivity curve is equal to 1
p
. Hence
wages will be the same if the productivity curves are the same. The second condition says
that the difference between the value of the hiring standard and the wage must be the same
for both groups.
Consider the case that males and females have identical supply functions and the market
wage levels W f and Wm are the same. In this case, the symmetric solution wf = wm and
s
(
wf ,W f , nf
)
= s (wm,Wm, nm) will satisfy (14) and (15). No discrimination would
occur. It can readily be seen that this result carries over to the case that labor supply for
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females is just a fraction α of the supply of males, amounting to f f = αfm for all θ, w,W
and nf = αnw.
However, this equal treatment will be ruled out if supply behavior of females differs
from that of males. It has been hypothesized and empirically supported that this is indeed
the case (M 2005, Ch. 7, S 2007, H et al. 2008, H et al. 2009):
Women seem to place more weight on non-monetary job attributes, such as proximity to
home and reasonable working hours, than men do. This would imply that f fw (θ, w,W ) <
fmw (θ, w,W ) for all (θ, w,W ), entailing a
f
w (w,W, n) < a
m
w (w,W, n).
Theorem: If, for some values (w,W ), the following assumptions are satisfied, the La-
grange conditions (14) and (15) are violated:
f f (θ, w,W ) = fm (θ, w,W ) for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]
f fw (θ, w,W ) < f
f
w (θ, w,W ) for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1] . (18)
In other words: If the supply and the distribution of productivities of men and women
is identical at some common wage offer w, given some shared market wage rate W , the
individual firm will have an incentive to offer discriminatory wages.
Proof : If the market wage level W and the wage rate w are identical for men an women,
condition (17) implies that the same hiring standard s is applied to men and women. Hence
the same fraction of men and women are employed and their average productivities will
be the same. As the women’s labor supply exhibits a lower sensitivity to wage changes, the
average sensitivity of supply, taken in both cases over the range of productivities [s, θ1] must
be less for women than for men. This violates (14). QED.
It can readily be seen that the theorem carries over to the case that labor supply for
females is just a fraction α of males, amounting to f f = αfm and f fw < αf
m
w for all θ and
some w,W .
To elucidate matters further, consider the case that men and women are lumped together.
This results in a supply function
f (θ, w,W ) = f f (θ, w,W ) + fm (θ, w,W )
and wage setting would proceed as in Section 1. We call this the pooling equilibrium. Assume
that at this equilibrium (18) obtains, viz. that at the common wage rate w the forthcoming
productivity distribution of males and females is just the same. Average productivity would
be
a =
1
2
af +
1
2
am
where employment levels for males and females nf = nm = 1
2
n are induced by the shared
hiring standard s. Regarding the sensitivity of productivity to wage changes, we would have
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(still with the same hiring standard and wage for men and women)
aw =
1
2
afw +
1
2
amw .
As aw =
1
p
from (9) and afw < a
m
w from (18) we must have, in violation of (16),
afw <
1
p
< amw
By lowering wages for women and increasing wages for men while keeping employment
levels and the average wage unchanged, the firm can increase its profits: Increasing the wage
for males by ∆ while keeping the employment of males and females unchanged requires a
reduction of the wage for women by the same amount. Such a change in payments would
leave the wage bill unchanged. Yet the induced change in average productivity is
1
2
(
afw − amw
)
∆ > 0.
Hence the firm can, by introducing a discriminatory wage policy, increase the productivity
of its work force without changing the wage bill. Such a change goes along with tightening
the hiring standard for males and loosening the hiring standard of females in order to
accommodate the change.
The argument carries over to the case that supply of females is not identical to that of
males, but only a fraction of the supply of males for all θ and the equilibrium wage obtained
under pooling.
Once the firm is offering different wages, it will have an incentive to adjust the share of
women and men in total employment in order to meet condition (17).
3 The Social Multiplier and Market Discrimination
According to the view expounded here, wage discrimination will be triggered by differences
in supply behavior of males and females, even if no initial discrimination exists on the
market level. As the argument applies to all firms in the market, we would expect market
wage levels for men and women to diverge. This will feed back on discrimination.
According to (11), an increased wage level for one of the groups will push the correspond-
ing optimal wage offer of the firm up, and vice versa., and the initial discrimination will be
augmented at the market level. This process is known as the “social multiplier” (S,
1981, G et al., 2003 and, regarding discrimination, S, 1982). Due to this
multiplier, we would expect significant discrimination to emerge in the market.
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Such a process may be seen as a kind of self-confirming cycle: The traditional sexual
division of labor ties women more closely to the home and thereby generates wage discrim-
ination of women. This supplies an incentive for maintaining the traditional pattern. It
appears as normality, and such normality re-establishes the social norm. As K
et al. (1986, 730f.) put it: “Psychological studies of adaptation suggest that any stable state
of affairs tends to become accepted eventually, at least in the sense that alternatives to it
no longer readily come to mind. Terms of exchange that are initially seen as unfair may in
time acquire the status of a reference transaction. Thus, the gap between the behavior that
people consider fair and the behavior that they expect in the marketplace tends to be rather
small.” Different social roles for men and women are reconfirmed this way and induce wage
discrimination in turn.
4 Quotas and Equal Pay Enforcement
A possibility of fighting discrimination would be to introduce a quota system, but this
would not eliminate discrimination. Consider the situation envisaged in the proof of the
theorem: At a common wage rate, the skill distribution of both populations are identical,
but women react less to wage changes than men do. As discussed above, this would create
an incentive for firms to pay women less than males. A quota system must be supported by
an anti-discrimination law that enforces equal pay for men and women doing the same job.
Such anti-discrimination law would by itself enforce identical hiring standards for both
groups and render a quota system superfluous. Yet the incentive to discriminate would
not be removed, and firms may actually implicitly discriminate in a system where explicit
wage discrimination is prohibited by law. This could be done by creating formally different
positions that are paid differently yet involve identical tasks. Another way to circumvent
anti-discrimination regulations could be to promote women more languidly, etc. Yet we can
expect such laws to mitigate discrimination to some degree.1
Note that the statistical theory of discrimination would require a quota system along with
equal pay enforcement in order to avoid discrimination through segregation. The selection
wage theory, as well as the closely related monopsony theory, differ here, as no quota system
seems to be required.
1 It is difficult to reach definite welfare conclusions in the model presented here. Yet the fact that welfare
can be increased in the closely related “dynamic monopsony” discrimination model by introducing an
anti-discrimination law suggest that a similar result may hold true in the wage context; see S (1982,
77f.). Yet this is a mere conjecture. Further analysis seems to be required here.
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5 Wage Differentials and Social Stereotypes
Wage discrimination is socially particularly objectionable if it is based on social prejudices
and stereotypes that are unrelated to productivity differentials between the groups involved.
(We do not, as a rule, object to more productive workers being better paid, unless pay
differentials get glaringly out of proportion.) Hence a central tenet of any theory of labor
market discrimination must be to establish a link between wage differentials and social
stereotypes.
The “taste” theory of discrimination assumes social stereotypes to shape preferences
(B, 1971). Yet it remains unclear in which way such stereotyped preferences affect be-
havior and can persist in the marketplace. If the joining of different types of workers is costly
because members of one group (males) share an aversion against working together with
members of the other group (women), the income of male workers who work together with
females ought to be higher than that of males working in an exclusively male environment.
This has not been observed. The other possible outcome would be segregation. In contrast,
the wage theory of discrimination would permit discrimination without segregation, and
without wage differentials between segregated and non-segregated environments for males.
In a more fundamental way, the “taste” theory of discrimination seems highly problematic,
mainly for two reasons: The first is that discriminatory preferences are taken as given. Yet,
as M (1920, vi.v.ix) has observed in a related context, “a great influence is exerted
by custom and public opinion which are themselves the outcome of the experience of past
generations.” In other words: The social norms that trigger discrimination are endogenous,
they are not arbitrary, and cannot be taken as givens for purposes of long-term analysis.
The other objection to assimilating discriminatory norms to personal tastes pertains to
the issue of externalities, “taste externalities,” if you will. While it does not matter to me
if you prefer tea over coffee at breakfast, it makes a difference for women and men what
social norms (“tastes”) prevail in society. A wide-spread taste for discrimination of women
reduces the welfare of women. In this sense it is not a private affair. It may be objected that
a preference for coffee will hurt the tea merchants. This is true, but they can change their
trade more easily than women can change their sex. The “taste”-parlance tends to fade out
these important problems.
The statistical theory of discrimination may explain why some indicators (like sex) convey
probabilistic information about productivities and induce wage differentials (P, 1972).
If social roles or stereotypes exist that actually trigger different behaviors of the groups, the
observation that an applicant is female may signal a higher probability of unfavorable events
in the prospective employment relation, perhaps a higher probability of terminating the
employment relationship prematurely for family reasons. If the firm plans to invest in the
worker, such a prospect will make the firm reluctant to hire a woman unless a lower wage or
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better productivity features compensate the drawback (L and R, 1990). As social
roles are internalized by both males and females, corresponding behavioral differences are
to be expected. In this way, such a theory ties social stereotypes to economic outcomes.
Such discrimination is perfectly efficient, as the labels “male” or “female” signal that the
workers differ in productivity, even if only probabilistically. From an efficiency point of
view this warrants different treatment. Yet if the term “discrimination” is construed as
referring to differential treatment of workers of equal productivity, the statistical theory
of discrimination does not provide a theory of discrimination. It treats wage differentials
between men and women just as other wage differentials. Further, it faces difficulties in
accounting for group discrimination (C, 1986, 724-9).
The monopsonistic theory of discrimination relates wage differentials not to productivity
but to supply behavior (R 1969, 302-4). If supply behavior is shaped by social
roles and stereotypes, the theory may account for forms of discrimination that do not
relate to productivity but rather to social roles. In this spirit it has been suggested and
empirically supported that discrimination may be traced to differential supply behavior of
males and females (S 1982, M 2005, Ch. 7, S 2007, H et al. 2008,
H et al. 2009, H forthcoming). Women place more emphasis on non-pecuniary
attributes of the workplace than men do. They value proximity to home and agreeable
working hours while males are more responsive to monetary incentives.1 Hence labor supply
of women, as seen from the point of view of the firm, will be less elastic than that of males,
and this gives rise to discrimination, including group discrimination.2
The theory proposed here builds on the same behavioral assumption regarding supply
behavior and develops a related idea in an efficiency-wage context.3 The outcome is again
triggered by behavioral differences entailed by social roles and stereotypes and leads to
group discrimination. In a sense, it provides a variant of the monopsonistic theory, yet
arguably the selection wage mechanism seems more realistic than the monopsonistic one, as
firms actually do engage in upgrading and downgrading of jobs (D, 2002, B
et al., 2009).
1 It may be conjectured that firms may use such non-monetary job features to attract women, giving rise to
another mechanism. This idea is not pursued here in order to establish the argument that differential pay
of equally productive workers is a possibility, if not a necessity, in an unregulated labor market. 2 The
assumption that female labor supply, as seen from the point of view of the firm, is less elastic than that of
males does not rule out that market supply for women may be more elastic than that of males. H et al.
(2008) discuss the issue and provide empirical evidence. 3 The fundamental idea of drawing on efficiency
wages in order to explain discrimination goes back at least to S (1973). S (2001, Section 5)
provides a variant in the turnover context that generates job discrimination.
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Conclusion
The selection wage theory of discrimination ties discrimination to different supply behavior
of the groups involved. Firms set wages in order to attract more qualified applicants. As
women respond less to wage differentials than men, firms can use the wage mechanism
more effectively for men than for women and this brings about a higher market wage level
for men than for women.
An empirical support for the view emerges from combining empirical studies of monop-
sonistic discrimination with studies that emphasize the variability of hiring standards.
The welfare implications of the view have to be addressed in future research.
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Parameters Used For The Illustrations
All graphs use the function
f (θ, w,W ) =
(
1 + log
( w
W
))
β (θ − 0.5)
over the range θ ∈ [0.5, 1.5], where β () denotes the probability density function of the Beta
distribution with parameters (3, 5).
Figure 1 (a) uses w
W
= 1, Figure 1 (b) uses w
W
= 1.2.
Figure 2 (a) uses w
W
= 1 and s = 0.7. This implies n = 0.85 and a = 0.92. Figure 2 (b)
uses in addition w
W
= 1.4 which implies and s = 0.8 and a = 0.97.
Figure 3 (a) gives the productivity curve around W = 1. The competitive wage is
w0 = 0.86. Figure 3 (b) adds the case W ′ = 1.2 with w′0 = 0.91. Figure 3 (c) gives the wage
w∗ = 1.1 forthcoming at p = 6.2.
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